When Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist David Halberstam died, media stars everywhere commemorated his death as though he were one of them — as though they do what he did — even though he had nothing but bottomless, intense disdain for everything they do. As he put it in a 2005 speech to students at the Columbia School of Journalism: “the better you do your job, often going against conventional mores, the less popular you are likely to be . . . . By and large, the more famous you are, the less of a journalist you are.”
Glenn Greenwald
“Over the past 10 years, almost nightly, Americans have witnessed the war in Vietnam, on television. Never before in history has a nation allowed its citizens to view uncensored scenes of combat, destruction and atrocities in their living rooms, in living color. Since television has become the principal-and most believed-source of news for most Americans, it is generally assumed that the constant exposure of this war on television was instrumental in shaping public opinion. It has become almost a truism, and the standard rhetoric of television executives, to say that television, showing the terrible truth of the war, caused the disillusionment of Americans with the war. This had also been the dominant view of those governing the nation during the war years. Depending on whether the appraisal has come from hawk or dove, television has thus been either blamed or applauded for the disillusionment of the American public with the war.” (85)
There have been several studies of the matter, suggesting a rather different picture. We will return to some of these issues in discussing the coverage of the Tet offensive, but we should observe that there are some rather serious questions about the standard formulations. Suppose that some Soviet investigators were to conduct an inquiry into coverage of the war in Afghanistan to determine whether Pravda should be blamed or applauded for the disillusionment of the Soviet public with the war. Would we consider such an inquiry to be meaningful without consideration of both the costs and the justice of the venture?
Epstein notes an obvious “logical problem” with the standard view: for the first six years of television coverage, from 1962 and increasingly through 1967, “the American public did approve of the war in Vietnam” according to polls. Furthermore, in a 1967 Harris poll for Newsweek, “64 percent of the nationwide sample said that television’s coverage made them more supportive of the American effort, and only 26 percent said that it had intensified their opposition,” leading the journal to conclude that “TV has encouraged a decisive majority of viewers to support the war.”
Epstein’s review of his and other surveys of television newscasts and commentary during this period explains why this should have been the case. “Up until 1965, the network anchormen seemed unanimous in support of American objectives in Vietnam,” and most described themselves as “hawks” until the end, while the most notable “dove”, Walter Cronkite, applauded “the courageous decision that Communism’s advance must be stopped in Asia” in 1965 and later endorsed the initial US commitment “to stop Communist aggression wherever it raises its head.” In fact, at no time during the war or since has there been any detectable departure from unqualified acceptance of the US government propaganda framework; as in the print media, controversy was limited to tactical questions and the problem of costs, almost exclusively the cost to the US.
The network anchormen not only accepted the framework of interpretation formulated by the state authorities, but also were optimistic about the successes achieved in the US war of defense against Vietnamese aggression in Vietnam. Epstein cites work by George Baily, who concludes: “The resultes in this study demonstrate the combat reports and the government statements generally gave the imporession that the Americans were in control, on the offense and holding the initiative, at least until Tet of 1968,” a picture accepted by the network anchormen. Television “focused on the progress” of the American ground forces, supporting this picture with “film, supplied by the pentagon, that showed the bombing of the North and suggesting that the Americans were also rebuilding South Vietnam”–while they were systematically destroying it, as could be deduced inferentially from scattered evidence for which no context or interpretation was provided. NBC’s “Huntley-Brinkley Report” described “the American forces in Vietnam as builders rather than destroyers,” a “central truth that needs underscoring.”
What made this especially deceptive and hypocritical was the fact, noted earlier, that the most advanced and cruel forms of devastation and killing–such as the free use of napalm, defoliants, and Rome plows–were used with few constraints in the South, because its population was voiceless, in contrast with the North, where international publicity and political complications threatened, so that at least visible areas around the major urban centers were spared.(86)
As for news coverage, “all threee networks had definite policies about showing graphic film of wounded American soldiers or suffereing Vietnamese civilians,” Epstein observes. “Producers of the NBC and ABC evening-news programs said that they ordered editors to delete excessively grisly or detailed shots,” and CBS had similar policies, which, according to former CBS news president Fred Friendly, “helped shield the audience from the true horror of the war.” “The relative bloodlessness of the war depicted on television helps to explain why only a minority in the Lou Harris-Newsweek poll said that television increased their dissatisfaciotn with the war”; such coverage yielded an impression, Epstein adds, of “a clean, effective technological war, which was rudely shaken at Tet in 1968.” As noted earlier, NBC withdrew television clips showing harsh treatment of Viet Cong prisoners at the request of the Kennedy administration.
Throughout this period, furthermore, “television coverage focused almost exclusively on the American effort.” There were few interviews with GVN military or civilian leaders,, “and the Vietcong and North Vietnamese were almost nonexistent on American television newscasts.”
Chomsky/Herman, Manufacturing Consent
I was wondering if he’ll have some ice water, when he meets up with McNamara.
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You’ve given me a completed thought without enough information as to what led you to it.
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OK, hows this? Via rogers rules.
>>When Lyndon Johnson said that “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost Middle America.” He recognized a political truth. Consider this.
In mid-February, in the immediate aftermath of the Tet Offensive, both Gallup and Harris noted a surge in American support for the war. Both pollsters said 61% of Americans favored a stronger military response against the North Vietnamese Army. 70% of Americans favored increased bombing of North Vietnamese targets, which was up from 63% in the previous December.
Then came Cronkite’s February 27 commentary.
To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory conclusion.
In early March, just a few days later, 49% of Americans said it was a mistake to have entered the Vietnam conflict. Only 35% believed the war would end within two years. 69% now approved of a phased withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam.*<<
The murders after we left, Cam. and SVN, are laid on his shoulders.
If there's any lesson learned we didn't leave Iraq hastily, causing the same carnage.
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Tet is generally considered the shark-jump date. But if you read the master when he speaketh thereof, he notes that Tet brought about a split in elite opinion, like at the Council on Foreign Relations and Rand Corporation, and it was that split that freed Cronkite and others to be openly unsupportive of the war from that point on. He further asserts that the war became unpopular due to the reports from returning soldiers (VVATW) and gonzo journalists, and not the mainstream media.
And if he says it, that’s the way it is.
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Note: David Crisp left a comment here to the effect of “The master speaketh” or some other such sentiment. I impulsively deleted the comment, something I rarely do, and regret it. David, if you want to put up your thoughtless and arrogant comment again, I won’t delete it, I promise.
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I thought he was paying me a compliment.
My second comment disappeared also.
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I’ll go look for it. You got spammed for some reason. It appears above.
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I think I said that if you took Mark Tokarski, Noam Chomsky and a thimble, you would find more useful information about journalism in the thimble than in the other two combined.
Now delete that, you piece of shit.
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Whoah! There it is. That’s the attitude I’m talking about.
What you do ain’t that complicated. You guys have mucked it all up with jargon to make it seem so. You just check on important and powerful people are up to, and then report back to us.
Start tomorrow, and don’t get discouraged. First day on the job is always rough.
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Fuck you.
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