The following excerpt is from the 2002 book Banking on Death, or Investing in Life: The History and Future of Pensions, by Robin Blackburn, pp 387-89. It is for wonks only. I am not going to fancy it up with pictures nor explain anything to anyone, save one comment: In the 1990’s, what they called “New Democrats” are now known as “Conservadems”, or “Blue Dogs.” The footnotes are the author’s. 
…The dilemma posed by Social Security was different. There was business backing for privatization but it was not yet overwhelming. In the absence of an agreed path to privatization the financial corporations were cautious, fearing that they could be lumbered with a large number of unprofitable small investors. Clinton had pleased his constituency by giving them something they really wanted – a large cut in capital gains tax – and for the time being most were content. Nevertheless, there was still a definite ideological and cultural impetus towards privatization. The extraordinary buoyancy of the stock market was giving added appeal to the idea that the program’s difficulties could be fixed by personal accounts. Prominent economists were coming forward with detailed blueprints. We will shortly consider the scheme drawn up my Martin Feldstien. But since Feldstein inclined to support the Republicans, it was also significant the Laurence Kotlikoff of Boston University and Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard produced a partial privatization plan for Social Security in 1997. These men were closer to [Larry] Summers and other figures in the administration, and had both served, with Washington’s approval, as advisers to the Russian government.
At a conference held at Harvard in June, 2001, former staff members of the Clinton Administration presented papers explaining that plans for partial privatization or mandatory private provision had been intensively prepared in 1997-98 but abandoned prior to the State of the Union address in 1999. A newspaper report explained:
President Clinton and his economic advisers spent 18 months secretly discussing the elements of a plan to add individual accounts to Social Security, but abandoned it when it became clear the president would be impeached … Throughout 1998 a working group met once or twice a week, with the agenda disguised on official schedules, to discuss options and has out details of a proposal. The president was briefed every six weeks.(1)
The so-called ‘Special Issues’ task force was set up by Larry Summers and Gene Sperling, the chair of the Council of Economic Advisers. While some of those involved favored privatization anyway, there was also the political objective of devising a reform that could bring together Republicans and New Democrats. One of the papers, written by the of the aides involved, makes it clear that this was believed to require mandatory private accounts: ‘For example, one option was for worker to indicate their choice of a private sector fund manager on their 1040 tax form. The working group’s estimates were at the level of detail that it was determined how many digits an ID number would have to be for each fund and how many key strokes would therefore be required to enter all the ID numbers each year.’
… But it was not technical or design questions which eventually doomed the working party’s efforts. In the event Monica Lewinsky sabotaged the privatization cause. As the aide explains:
Toward the end of 1998, as the possibility that the President would be impeached came clearly into view, the policy dynamic of Social Security debate changed dramatically and it became clear to the White House that this was not a time to take risks on the scale that would be necessary to achieve a deal on an issue as contentious as Social Security reform. The President decided to follow a strategy of trying to unite the Democrats around a plan that would strengthen Social Security by transferring some of the budget surpluses to Social Security and investing a portion of the transferred funds in equities. (2)
A paper by a different group of Clinton aides further explained that the political situation by no means deterred the White House from courting controversy” ‘Put simply, the communications and political staff at the White House were enthusiastic about anything, including Social Security reform, that would divert attention from the scandal. Clinton evidently decided that it would be better to advocate controversial means for saving Social Security than to arouse a different sort of controversy that would have attended a privatization bid.
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(1) Thomas E. MacUrdy and John Shoven, ‘Asset Allocation and Risk Allocation: Can Social Security improve its future solvency problem by investing in private securities?, in John Y. Campbell and Martin Feldstein eds, Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform, Chicago and London, pp 11-32.
(2) Jim Stanford, Paper Boom, Ottawa 1999, p. 349
























